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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Ronald Richard Rodrigues, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals an amended restitution order imposed following a guilty 
plea to criminal nonsupport. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of criminal nonsupport; as part of his 
guilty plea, he agreed to pay all of his delinquent child support through sentencing 
as restitution. At sentencing, however, the trial court miscalculated the amount that 
defendant owed and imposed a lesser amount. After learning of its error a few 
weeks later, the court corrected the restitution order to reflect defendant's 
agreement. 
1. Did the trial court have the authority to correct its restitution order, where 
the original order contained a clerical error regarding defendant's restitution 
amount? 
Standard of Review. The trial court had the authority to correct a clerical error 
under rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. "[T]he interpretation of a rule 
of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness." State ex rel. 
A.M.D., 2006 UT App 457,17,153 P.3d 724 (quotations and citation omitted). 
2. Did the trial court violate the Double Jeopardy Clause when it corrected 
defendant's restitution order? 
Standard of Review. This issue is unpreserved, so no standard of review 
applies. If reviewed, this is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State 
v. One 1980 Cadillac, 2001 UT 26,f8,21 P.3d 212. 
3. Did the trial court violate defendant's right to allocution when it heard 
arguments regarding its clerical error without defendant being present? 
Standard of Review. Constitutional questions are reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269,1 7,139 P.3d 1066. 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as 
the court may order. 
United States Constitution, Amendment V: 
"... nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb . . . " 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 23, 2003, defendant was charged with two counts of criminal 
nonsupport. R. 1-4. In the first count, the State alleged that defendant had failed to 
support the child that he had with Jennifer Falsone; in the second count, the State 
alleged that defendant had failed to support the two children that he had with 
Michele Rodrigues. R. 1-4.1 Defendant left the state prior to trial, was jailed in 
another state, and was not returned to Utah until April 2005. R. 20. 
On May 19,2005, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State. R. 
46. In the agreement, defendant agreed to plead guilty to one of the two counts and 
lrThe trial court's restitution order was ultimately correct with respect to 
Jennifer Falsone, and that order is not at issue in this appeal. But the two claims 
were tried together below, so the State provides detail regarding that claim for 
context. 
3 
then pay restitution "in the amount of the total amount of child support arrears 
owed for the support of my children on both counts from May 1999 through the 
date of sentencing/' R. 53. Defendant acknowledged that he owed $289 per month 
in support to Jennifer Falsone and $328 per month to Michele Rodrigues, and he also 
agreed that the final restitution amount would include interest. R. 53-54.2 
Defendant failed to appear for sentencing, however, so the proceedings were 
continued. R. 66-67. An arrest warrant was issued, and defendant was not 
apprehended until January 17,2007. R. 68,72. 
A PSI was prepared prior to sentencing. R. 79. The PSI first confirmed that 
defendant owed $289 per month to Jennifer Falsone and $328 per month to Michele 
Rodrigues. R. 79:3. The PSI then determined that defendant had not paid any child 
support to Jennifer Falsone since May 1,1999, and that defendant had only paid $80 
in child support to Michele Rodrigues. R. 79:3. The PSI concluded that defendant 
owed $63,507.71 as of February 2,2007: $34,317.82 to Michele Rodrigues, $19,433.72 
to Jennifer Falsone, and $9,756.17 to the State of Utah for reimbursement of public 
assistance. R. 79:10. 
2
 Defendant's delinquency in both cases actually pre-dated May 1999, but the 
parties agreed to begin the restitution obligation from May 1999 during the plea 
negotiations. R. 127: 24-25. 
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Defendant did not contest the PSI's accuracy at the sentencing hearing, but 
instead stated that he "concurred] with the recommendations in the pre-sentence 
report/7 R. 127:1-2. Defendant also did not object or disagree when the State noted 
that he had not paid any child support to Jennifer Falsone, and only $80 in support 
to Michele Rodrigues. R. 127: 3-4, 14-16. Michele Rodrigues also testified and 
confirmed that defendant had owed her $328 per month in support during the 
relevant period. R. 127:10. Defendant did not object to this assertion. 
The court asked the parties what the "total" amount owed was. R. 127: 4. 
The State responded that the "total" amount owed as of "today's date" was 
$24,078.76 for Michele Rodrigues and $30,680.96 for Jennifer Falsone. R. 127:4.3 The 
court accepted this assertion, added the figures together, and concluded that 
defendant's "total arrearage" was "$54,760." R. 127:4-5. At the close of the hearing, 
the court ordered defendant to pay $54,600 in restitution. R. 127:16. The court did 
not provide any explanation for dropping $160 from the overall amount. In its 
written sentencing order, filed on March 29,2007, the court stated that this amount 
"represent[ed] child support arrears for the Defendant's children with Jennifer 
3
 At the time of sentencing, defendant owed $19,778.44 to Jennifer Falsone 
and $10,902.52 to the State. R. 111. The $30,680.96 amount was a combination of 
these two obligations. R. 111. 
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Falsone and Michele Rodrigues through March 19,2007" and ordered defendant to 
pay $54,600 in restitution. R. 85. 
One month later, the prosecutor filed a motion to amend the restitution order, 
claiming that it did not accurately reflect the restitution that defendant owed and 
had agreed to pay. R. 89-92. The prosecutor acknowledged that she had originally 
informed the judge that defendant owed Michele Rodrigues $24,078.76, but 
explained that she had inadvertently taken that figure from a document that had 
been prepared prior to defendant's flight from Utah in May 2005. R. 127:18-19. 
The prosecutor then provided the court with spreadsheets showing that based on 
defendant's accepted obligation of $328 per month (plus interest), the original 
award only covered defendant's obligations through December 2004. R. 94-104; 
Addenda A & B. Given that defendant had agreed to pay the "total amount of child 
support" "through the date of sentencing," R. 53, the prosecutor asked the court to 
amend the order to reflect defendant's actual obligation to Michele Rodrigues at the 
time of sentencing, which would have been $34,722.70. R. 89-104; Addendum B. 
Defendant did not file a written response to this motion, nor did he contest 
any of the underlying facts when the matter was argued on August 15,2007. R. 127: 
18-31. Instead, defendant asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction to amend its 
restitution order, and then claimed that amending the order would violate his "due 
6 
process" rights. R. 127:19-20. Though defendant was not present, his attorney did 
not argue that defendant had a right to be present for this hearing. R. 127:18-31. 
Following argument, the court noted that defendant's plea bargain required 
defendant to pay restitution "from May '99 to whenever he was sentenced," R. 127: 
25, and then concluded that there had been a "misstatement of what the actual total 
amount of restitution was" in the original order. R. 127: 30. Relying on rule 30, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court amended the restitution order and 
required defendant to pay $34,722.70 to Michele Rodrigues. R. 110; 127:19,27,30. 
The court stated that this amendment would "correct the error" and make the 
award "conform to the parties' intent" R. 127: 30. Defendant now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The trial court retained jurisdiction to amend its restitution order. 
Under rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, trial courts can correct clerical 
errors at any time. In this case, defendant agreed to pay his "total amount of child 
support" as restitution, but the original restitution order only covered defendant's 
obligations through December 2004. This mistake was not deliberate, nor was it the 
product of any conscious judicial determination. It was therefore correctible under 
rule 30. 
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Point II: Defendant claims that the trial court violated his double jeopardy 
rights when it amended the restitution order, but that claim is unpreserved. 
Defendant never raised a double jeopardy claim below, but instead only argued that 
his "due process" rights had been violated. This did not preserve a double jeopardy 
claim. 
In any event, the trial court did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause when 
it amended the original restitution order. There are two reasons for this. First, 
restitution orders are compensatory, not punitive, and therefore do not implicate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. Second, while the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a 
court from punishing a defendant a second time, it does not prevent a court from 
correcting a clerical error in the original sentence. 
Point III: The trial court did not violate defendant's right to allocution when 
it heard arguments on the State's motion in defendant's absence. The right to 
allocution guarantees a defendant the right to speak at trial and sentencing, but it 
does not provide the same right when a court considers an alleged clerical error. 





THE TRIAL COURT RETAINED JURISDICTION TO CORRECT 
THE CLERICAL ERROR IN ITS ORIGINAL SENTENCE 
Defendant claims that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to amend the 
original restitution order. Aplt. Br. 10-22. Defendant is incorrect. 
A trial court may correct y/[c]lerical mistakes in judgments . . . at any time" 
under rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. A clerical error "is an error in 
the entry or recording of a judgment; it is a mistake or omission that prevents the 
judgment as entered from accurately reflecting the judgment that was rendered." 46 
Am.Jui.2d Judgments § 139 (2008). Such errors are akin to "blunders in execution." 
46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 142 (2008). When correcting a clerical error, courts 
"correct the record which has been made, so that it will truly express the action 
taken but which through inadvertence or mistake was not truly recorded." Diehl 
Lumber Transp. Inc. v. Mickelson, 802 P.2d 739, 742 (Utah App. 1990). 
Courts thus distinguish clerical errors from "judicial errors." While a clerical 
error is the result of "a minor mistake or inadvertence," Black's Law Dictionary, 
Error (8th ed. 2004), a judicial error involves "the deliberate result of the exercise of 
judicial reasoning and determination." State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388,1389 (Utah 
1988) (quotations and citation omitted). "[T]he distinction between clerical error 
9 
and judicial error does not turn on whether the correction of the error results in a 
substantive change in the judgment. Rather, the distinction turns on whether the 
error was the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and determination/' Cardwell v. 
Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 672,674 (Ky. 2000) (quotations and citation omitted). In 
this manner, the distinction "depends on whether [the error] was made in rendering 
the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered/' Richards v. Siddoway, 471 
P.2d 143,145 (Utah 1970). 
No Utah court has considered the question of whether a judge's mistaken 
restitution calculation constitutes a clerical error or a judicial error. In Bishop v. 
Gentec Inc., 2002 UT 36,48 P.3d 218, however, the Utah Supreme Court considered a 
similar question in the context of a civil suit and held that calculation errors are 
clerical in nature. The jury in that case had apportioned fault between the plaintiff 
and two separate defendants. Id. at \ \ 2-7. Following trial, several jurors signed 
affidavits stating that the damage award had been based on mistaken calculations. 
Id. at 16 . The jurors testified that after deciding on the fault apportionment, they 
had subtracted the plaintiff's apportioned fault from the damage award, "not 
realizing that the subtraction for [the plaintiff]'s fault was the duty of the trial court, 
not the jury." Id. 
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On appeal, the supreme court held that even though the verdict had already 
been issued, the judgment could still be revised to correct the jury's mistaken 
calculation. Id. at f f 27-32. The court noted that when considering a clerical error, 
'It matters little whether an error was made by the court clerk, the jury foreman, 
counsel, a party, or the judge himself, so long as it is clearly a formal error that 
should be corrected in the interest of having [the] judgment.. . reflect what was 
done or intended." Id. at f 30 (quotations and citation omitted). 
The Bishop court specifically rejected the suggestion that a judgment cannot be 
amended once reduced to an enumerated damage amount. The court held that 
while a judgment's underlying logic is not clerical in nature, the underlying math 
behind the judgment is. Thus, a mistake in "accurately recording the intent of the 
jury in its calculation of the damage award constitutes correction of a clerical error, 
not a judicial error." Bishop, 2002 UT 36, % 32; accord Haase v. Ashley Valley Med. Ctr., 
2003 UT App 260U at * 2 (Addendum C) (holding that a jury's mistaken calculation 
was a clerical error, rather than a judicial error).4 
4
 The correction in Bishop was authorized under rule 60(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Bishop v. Gentec Inc., 2002 UT 36, \ \ 27-32,48 P.3d 218. In State v. Moya, 
815 P.2d 1312 (Utah App. 1991), this Court held that because rule 60(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, are "nearly 
textually identical," the result in that case would have been the same under either 
rule. Moya, 815 P.2d at 1314 n.3. 
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This Court recently reached a similar result in Frito-Lay & Transcontinental 
Insurance Co. v. Labor Commission, 2008 UT App 314, — P.3d —. In Frito-Lay, an ALJ 
issued a workers compensation order that "failed to explicitly exclude those 
stipulated weeks7' that the claimant had actually been able to work. Id. at \ 5. The 
Utah Labor Commission subsequently affirmed the ALJ's order. Id. at f 7. This 
Court reversed, holding that the ALJ's "miscalculation" was a clerical error that was 
correctible under rule 60(a). Id. at % 16. This Court reaffirmed that when a 
calculation "mistake" is "clear from the record," a trial court can "correct the 
incorrect total amount of judgment" to reflect the correct amount. Id. (quotations, 
citation, and alterations omitted). 
The decisions in Bishop and Frito-Lay are not unique. Other courts have 
similarly concluded that calculation errors are clerical, rather than judicial. The 
decision in Milazzo v. Schwartz, 871 A.2d 1040 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005), is illustrative. 
In Milazzo, the trial court entered a deficiency judgment against a debtor, but then 
modified that judgment after discovering that it had performed the wrong 
calculations. Id. at 1041-42. Like defendant in this case, the debtor in Milazzo argued 
that the original ruling was not reviewable for clerical error. Id. The Connecticut 
Appellate Court disagreed, concluding that the error was clerical because "the 
amount of the deficiency judgment owed by the defendant to the plaintiff did not 
12 
reflect the actual amount owed." Id. at 1043. Given this, the court refused to allow 
the debtor to "escape the full amount for which he is liable to the plaintiff because of 
a simple mistake made in the mathematical calculation of the deficiency judgment." 
Id. Other courts have reached similar results. See Foley v. Ziegler, 931 A.2d 498,501 
n.2 (Me. 2007) (concluding that "a small clerical error was committed" in 
"calculating [one party's] annual income"); Westmark Commercial Mortg. Fund IV v. 
TeenformAssocs., L.P., 827 A.2d 1154,1162 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding 
that the miscalculation of interest constituted a "clerical error"); Lischio v. Gill, 704 
A.2d 216,217 (R.L 1997) (concluding that an miscalculation of interest was a "clerical 
error"). 
Like the errors discussed above, the mistake in this case was nothing more 
than a calculation error. In his May 2005 plea agreement, defendant agreed to pay 
restitution in the "total amount of child support arrears owed for the support of my 
children on both counts from May 1,1999 through the date of sentencing," plus 
interest. R. 53-54. Defendant was not sentenced until March 2007, a period of 94 
months. While the original restitution order required defendant to pay $24,078.76 to 
Michele Rodrigues, at $328 per month (plus interest), that order would only have 
covered defendant's "total amount of child support" had defendant been sentenced 
in December 2004. Addendum A. But defendant left Utah prior to sentencing, R. 
13 
66-67, so defendant was not sentenced until March 19, 2007. At that point, 
defendant's actual obligation was $34,722.70. R. 89-104; Addendum B. 
Thus, as a matter of simple math, the original restitution order did not reach 
as far as defendant, the State, and the court had agreed that it would reach. Upon 
discovering this mistake, the court was allowed to recalculate its original order in 
order to correct its mistaken calculation. 
In response, defendant first suggests that the error could not have been 
clerical because the mistake was not apparent from the record as it existed "prior to 
judgment." Aplt. Br. 14-15. While it is true that clerical errors are sometimes 
apparent on the record (such as when an oral judgment is incorrectly reduced to 
writing), Bishop demonstrates that this is not always the case. The error in that case 
was a calculation error that was not apparent until jurors submitted affidavits, 
which only occurred after the verdict had been delivered. Bishop, 2002 UT 36, % 6. 
But even if clerical errors are limited in the manner suggested by defendant, 
the error in this case was apparent from the record as it existed prior to sentencing. 
As part of his plea, defendant agreed to pay the "total amount of child support 
arrears owed . . . from May 1,1999 through the date of sentencing/' R. 53. It is 
undisputed that defendant owed $328 per month (plus interest) in child support to 
Michele Rodrigues. R. 53-54. This monthly obligation has never changed during 
14 
the pendency of this action. The court's correction therefore did not rely on any 
new evidence, but instead simply reflected updated calculations that were 
performed using figures that were available in the record prior to sentencing. 
Defendant also suggests that the trial court may have exercised discretion as 
to "whether to require Rodrigues to pay restitution" for the period between his 
original plea and his actual sentence. Aplt. Br. 17. While the court could have 
chosen to deviate from the original plea, the record demonstrates that it did not. 
When the court asked the prosecutor for a restitution recommendation at the 
original sentencing hearing, the court asked what the "total" amount owed was. R. 
127:4. It then adopted that amount without ever stating that it intended to reduce 
the amount by a matter of months or years. R. 127:4-5,16. In its written order, the 
court expressed its belief that the amount "represented] child support arrears for 
the Defendant's children with Jennifer Falsone and Michele Rodrigues through 
March 19, 2007." R. 85 (emphasis added). The court never indicated that it had 
decided to cap defendant's restitution obligation at some fixed date that preceded 
defendant's actual sentencing. When the court revisited the issue while considering 
the State's motion to amend, it therefore noted that the agreement had required 
defendant to pay his obligations "from May '99 to whenever he was sentenced." R. 
127: 25. Thus, while the trial court's original order deviated from both the State's 
15 
original recommendation and from defendant's actual obligation, the record shows 
that the court had always intended to order full restitution, but simply failed to do 
so by mistake. 
In sum, the error in this case was not an error of judicial reasoning or studied 
determination; rather, the error was an error of multiplication, unintentionally 
initiated by the prosecutor and inadvertently memorialized by the court. In 
correcting its mistake, the court did not reconsider its reasoning, but instead simply 
redid its math, using defendant's uncontested monthly obligations as the sole 
predicate. The court therefore "corrected" its earlier mistake to make the restitution 
award "reflect what was done or intended." Bishop, 2002 UT 36, 1 30. TWs 
calculation correction was inherently clerical in nature. 
II. 
DEFENDANT'S DOUBLE JEOPARDY RIGHTS WERE NOT 
VIOLATED 
Defendant claims that the court violated his double jeopardy rights when it 
corrected the restitution award. Aplt Br. 22-29. This claim, should be rejected for 
three reasons. First,itisunpreserved. Second, restitution orders are compensatory, 
not punitive, and therefore do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Third, 
defendant did not have a legitimate expectation in the finality of the court's clerical 
error. 
16 
A. Defendant's double jeopardy claim is unpreserved. 
At the hearing below, defendant claimed that his "due process" rights would 
be violated if the court amended the original restitution order. R. 127: 19-20. 
Defendant did not specifically invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause, but now argues 
that his reference to his due process rights preserved this argument. Aplt. Br. 28-29. 
This is incorrect. 
"A general rule of appellate review... is that a contemporaneous objection or 
some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial 
record before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal/' State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546,551 (Utah 1987). "The objection must be specific enough to give the 
trial court notice of the very error of which counsel complains/' State v. Bryant, 965 
P.2d 539,546 (Utah App. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted). The purpose of 
this requirement is to afford the lower courts an "opportunity to correct the errors if 
appropriate/' State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993) (quotations and 
citation omitted). 'To serve these policies,... the preservation rule applies to every 
claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74,111,10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted). The preservation rule applies to double 
jeopardy claims. See State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, f 4, n.l, 157 P.3d 809 
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(refusing to reach a double jeopardy claim that was raised for the first time on 
appeal). 
Defendant did not even mention the Double Jeopardy Clause below, let alone 
explain how it applies to a motion to correct a miscalculation in a restitution award. 
R. 127:19-20. He did not cite to any cases interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause, 
nor did he explain how a corrected sentence would violate the specific rights 
protected by that clause. While defendant correctly notes that double jeopardy is an 
incorporated constitutional right, Aplt. Br. 28, defendant does not cite to any 
authority holding that reference to the Due Process Clause specifically raises all 
other constitutional rights in any given case. The trial court therefore did not have 
the opportunity to consider his double jeopardy claim, let alone correct any such 
error, and the claim is therefore unpreserved. 
In response, defendant argues that although the issue may not have been 
preserved below, review is still appropriate under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Defendant is incorrect. 
"While rule 22(e) allows a court to review an illegal sentence at any time, it 
must be 'narrowly circumscribed' to prevent abuse/' State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT 
App 9,115,84 P.3d 854 (citation omitted). Though parties can obtain relief 
under the rule when a sentence is "patently" or "manifestly" illegal, this 
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"generally occurs in one of two situations: (1) where the sentencing court has no 
jurisdiction, or (2) where the sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range." 
Id. 
Neither category applies in this case. As set forth above, the trial court had 
jurisdiction to amend this restitution order because the original order contained a 
clerical error. In addition, defendant has not contended that the amended 
restitution order exceeds any statutory limit on restitution orders in criminal 
nonsupport cases. Thus, rule 22(e) is inapplicable. 
This claim is therefore unpreserved and should not be addressed by this 
Court.5 
5
 Even if defendant's double jeopardy claim is properly before this Court, 
this Court should still decline defendant's invitation to conduct a separate state 
constitutional analysis. Defendant did not raise a state constitutional claim 
below, but instead simply invoked his general "due process" rights. R. 127: 20. 
In State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,164 P.3d 397, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that while it understood "counsel's hesitance to robustly address state 
constitutional issues in the lower courts," the preservation rules still require "a 
state constitutional law argument" to be raised "in the trial court." Id. at H 17, 
18. Utah's appellate courts are accordingly "resolute" in "refus[ing] to take up 
constitutional issues which have not been properly preserved, framed, and 
briefed." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13,114,122 P.3d 605, reversed on other 
grounds by 547 U.S. 398 (2006). 
Defendant did not preserve a state constitutional claim below. Thus, if this 
Court reaches the double jeopardy claim, it should limit its analysis to the 
federal constitution. 
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B. If reached, defendant's double jeopardy claim should be rejected 
on its merits. 
If reached, this Court reject defendant's double jeopardy claim for two 
reasons. First, the Double Jeopardy Clause is inapplicable to restitution orders. 
Second, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent a court from correcting a 
clerical error. 
1. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to restitution 
orders. 
Under Utah law, a trial court can order a defendant to pay restitution in order 
to cover the "pecuniary damages" suffered by a victim as the result of the 
defendant's crime. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(ll) (West 2004). Pecuniary 
damages include "all special damages, but not general damages . . . arising out of 
the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities." Id. § 77-38a-
102(6). "An award of pecuniary damages as restitution for crime is justified 
because proof of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt necessarily meets 
the preponderance of evidence standard establishing civil liability." State v. 
Houston, 2000 UT App 342,f12, 9 P.3d 188. 
In Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1996), the supreme court held that 
because restitution orders are compensatory in nature, such orders do not implicate 
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double jeopardy. Id. at 1027-28.6 According to the court, "it is clear from the 
legislative scheme that restitution is not a 'punishment' but a civil penalty whose 
purpose is entirely remedial, i.e., to compensate victims for the harm caused by a 
defendant and whose likely intent is to spare victims the time, expense, and 
emotional difficulties of separate civil litigation" Id. at 1027. As a result, the court 
held that restitution orders do not qualify as "'punishment' for double jeopardy 
purposes/' Id. at 1028; accord Houston, 2000 UT App 342, 1 12. But see State v. 
Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343,f12 n.6,992 P.2d 995 (holding that "[w]hile an order 
of restitution is intended to provide a remedy to the victim, it is also part of the 
punishment imposed upon the offender"). 
As in Monson, the amended restitution order in this case did nothing more 
than compensate the victim for the harm she suffered from defendant's crime. 
Specifically, it required defendant to pay the child support that he was required to 
have paid during the relevant period. As such, defendant was not "punished" for 
purposes of double jeopardy, but was instead simply required to make his victim 
whole. Under Monson, double jeopardy was inapplicable to this order. 
6
 Though the restitution order in Monson was imposed by the Board of 
Pardons and Parole, rather than the trial court at sentencing, the restitution order in 
that case was similarly limited to the victim's pecuniary damages. Monson v. Carver, 
928 P.2d 1017,1027 (Utah 1996). 
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2. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent a trial court 
from correcting a clerical error* 
The Double Jeopardy Clause states that no person can "be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb/' United States Const 
amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause "embodies three separate protections: 
(1) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, 
(2) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, 
and (3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense/' Bernat v. 
Allphin, 2005 UT1,111,106 P.3d 707 (quotations and citation omitted); accord 
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,440 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by 
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997). While the prohibition against 
multiple punishments "has deep roots in our history and jurisprudence/' Halper, 
490 U.S. at 440, sentencing procedures themselves "'traditionally receive less 
double jeopardy protection than do prosecutions.'" State v. Maguire, 1999 UT 
App 45,111,975 P.2d 476 (quoting Montoya v. New Mexico, 55 F.3d 1496,1498 
(10th Cir. 1995)). The Supreme Court's decisions therefore "clearly establish that 
a sentence does not have the qualities of constitutional finality that attend an 
acquittal." United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117,134 (1980). 
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Thus, "[resentencing per se does not implicate the double jeopardy 
protection from multiple punishments/' Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 11. 
Instead, the Double Jeopardy Clause is only violated when a resentencing upsets 
a defendant's "legitimate expectation of finality in his original proceedings." Id. 
at 18 ; see also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 137-39; Warnick v. Booher, 425 F.3d 842, 
847 (10th Cir. 2005). But while the "analytical touchstone for double jeopardy is 
the defendant's legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence," legitimacy 
"may be influenced by many factors." State v. Jones, 650 N.W.2d 844,847 (Wis. 
App. 2002). "If a circumstance exists to undermine the legitimacy of that 
expectation, then a court may permissibly increase the sentence" without 
violating double jeopardy. Id. 
No Utah court has yet considered the question of whether the Double 
Jeopardy Clause prevents correction of a clerical error. A number of courts from 
other jurisdictions have considered the question, however, and have held that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar such corrections. 
The decision in Gallinat v. State, 941 So.2d 1237 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), is 
illustrative. In Gallinat, the trial court miscalculated the defendant's incarceration 
history prior to sentencing and inadvertently gave him credit for time that he had 
not actually served. Id. at 1238. After the trial court was alerted to its 
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miscalculation, it issued a "corrected order" that accurately reflected defendant's 
incarceration history. Id. 
On appeal, the court held that this correction did not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. The court held that because clerical errors are "not [the] result of 
judicial decision-making," id. at 1241, a defendant cannot obtain a legitimate 
expectation that the errors will be permanently enforced. Instead, "the defendant's 
only legitimate expectation is that he or she will serve the full sentence," rather than 
the inadvertently reduced sentence stemming from the mathematical error. Id. at 
1242 (emphasis added). "Because correcting a time-served reporting error does not 
defeat a defendant's legitimate expectations, it should not be held to violate double 
jeopardy." Id. 
The New York Court of Appeals reached a similar result in People v. Minaya, 
54 N.Y.2d 360 (N.Y. 1981). Minaya pleaded guilty to one count of attempted 
robbery, and the plea agreement called for him to receive an eight-year sentence. Id. 
at 362. At sentencing, the court stated that it was going to follow the plea 
agreement, but then inadvertently sentenced the defendant to a three-year sentence. 
Id. at 363. The court learned of its mistake three months later and issued a corrected 
sentence giving Minaya eight years in prison. Id. 
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On appeal, Minaya claimed that the corrected sentence violated double 
jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that Minaya could 
not have acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in the court's clerical error. 
[W]e know of no case binding on this court which has held that a 
defendant who is mistakenly sentenced to a lesser term than he agreed 
to, should immediately upon commencing the sentence acquire a 
vested interest in the error so that it would be unfair, under the double 
jeopardy clause, to correct the error and make the defendant serve out 
the term of his own sentencing agreement. 
Id. at 366. Thus, "there is no basis for concluding that the double jeopardy clause 
posed any impediment to the court's power to correct the error in the sentence." Id. 
This rule has been followed in numerous cases, many involving clerical errors 
resulting from misstatements at sentencing. In Nelson v. Commonwealth, 407 S.E.2d 
326 (Va. Ct. App. 1991), for example, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 
fifteen years in prison, "to be suspended after Nelson had served two years." Id. at 
327. Approximately fifteen minutes after the court pronounced sentence, the court 
brought the defendant and the attorneys back into the courtroom and informed 
them that it had misspoken. "The trial judge then stated that it was her intention to 
sentence Nelson to fifteen years in the penitentiary, to be suspended after Nelson 
served ten years, not two years; the court modified Nelson's sentence accordingly." 
Id. 
25 
The Virginia Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's double jeopardy 
challenge to the corrected sentence, holding that the error was clerical in nature. 
//rThe record clearly supports a finding that the trial court did not intend to impose a 
lenient sentence and that, at the time of imposing sentence, she actually believed she 
had ordered Nelson to serve ten years." Id. at 328. The appellate court concluded 
that the original sentence "was an oversight much the same as [a] drafting error," 
and that it did not violate double jeopardy. Id. at 328-29. 
A wide number of other courts have agreed, and have accordingly refused to 
bar resentencing when necessary to correct a clerical error. See Hicks v. Duckworth, 
708 RSupp. 214, 218 (N.D. Ind. 1989) ("[I]t is not inconsistent with the Double 
Jeopardy Clause for a defendant to be resentenced upon remand according to the 
original intentions of the trial judge even if this entails enhancement of one or more 
of the original sentences."); DeMario v. State, 933 P.2d 558, 561 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1997) (allowing a court to correct an "objectively ascertainable mistake" without 
violating double jeopardy); Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 672, 674 (Ky. 2000); 
Newberry v. State, 812 S.W.2d 210,212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lane, 957 P.2d 9, 
19 (Mont. 1998) ("When a district court corrects a written judgment and 
commitment to conform to the one it originally intended, double jeopardy does not 
apply to bar the correction."); Warnick v. Booher, 144 P.3d 897,902-03 (Okla. Crim. 
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App. 2006) (allowing court to correct a clerical error in the sentence that was created 
by the department of corrections' record-keeping error); Commonwealth v. Kunish, 
602 A.2d 849, 853 (Pa. 1992); Grant v. State, 247 S.W.3d 360, 374 (Tex. App. 2008) 
(allowing court to make a "correction in sentence to reflect a misstatement"); State v. 
Burt, 614 N. W.2d 42,46 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (no double jeopardy violation to correct 
"an error of speech in pronouncing" the original sentence). 
Thus, defendant is incorrect when he claims that "when a court enters a final 
restitution order as part of a legal sentence . . . it cannot later amend its order to 
increase restitution." Aplt. Br. 25. While this may be true with judicial errors, it is 
not true when the court corrects a clerical error. 
Given this distinction, the authority cited by defendant is readily 
distinguishable. For example, defendant cites Strickland v. State, 681 So.2d 929 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Aplt. Br. 25. In Strickland, the trial court originally ordered the 
defendant to pay a specific amount in restitution to cover the injuries the victim had 
testified about at sentencing. Strickland, 681 So.2d at 929. The court later reopened 
sentencing, however, and heard additional testimony from the victim regarding 
additional injuries that had not been discussed at the original hearing; at the close of 
this second sentencing hearing, the court ordered the defendant to pay "additional 
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restitution/7 Id. at 929-30. On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeals held that 
this second sentence violated double jeopardy. Id. 
In contrast to Strickland, the amended sentence below did not require 
additional evidence, nor did it address injuries not covered in the original order. As 
explained above, the court in this case corrected a calculation error regarding the 
injuries that were at issue in the original order, and it did so using figures that were 
available at the original hearing. 
Defendant also cites to Wilson v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1293 (bid. Ct. App. 1997). 
Aplt. Br. 25. Wilson was convicted of burglary and theft, and the court ordered him 
to pay restitution for the burglary conviction. Wilson, 688 N.E.2d at 1294. After the 
burglary conviction was overturned on appeal, the trial court reopened the case and 
ordered Wilson to pay restitution on the theft charge. Id. at 1294-95. On appeal, the 
court held that the additional order of restitution was improper because it was not 
part of the original sentence. Id. at 1295-96. 
In this case, however, the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution at 
the original hearing, and the underlying guilty plea is not at issue in this appeal. 
Thus, unlike Wilson, the trial court in this case did not add anything new to the 
defendant's sentence, but instead simply corrected an already existing order. Wilson 
is therefore inapposite. 
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Defendant also claims that double jeopardy precludes a court from amending 
a restitution order "[o]nce a legal sentence has been imposed and a defendant has 
begun to serve that sentence/' Aplt. Br. 25. This is incorrect. As noted by the 
Second Circuit, "it was once thought that a sentence could never be increased" 
without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Rosario, 386 F.3d 166, 
170 (2d Cir. 2004). That view was "altered," however, by the Supreme Court's 
decision in DiFrancesco. Rosario, 386 F.3d at 170. Under DiFrancesco, "the application 
of the double jeopardy clause to an increase in a sentence turns on the extent and 
legitimacy of a defendant's expectation of finality in that sentence." Rosario, 386 
F.3d at 171 (quotations and citation omitted). While DiFrancesco dealt with a case in 
which the government had a statutory right to appeal, "the reasoning of Justice 
Blackmun's opinion for the majority went beyond the specific facts of the case, 
undercutting the basis for any general rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
precludes a sentence increase once the defendant has commenced serving the 
sentence." United States v. Bello, 767 F.2d 1065,1069 (4th Cir. 1985). 
Thus, "after DiFrancesco, a court may, in some situations, modify a sentence 
after the defendant has begun serving it. The proper inquiry is the defendant's 
legitimate expectations in the finality of his sentence." Hicks v. Duckworth, 922 F.2d 
409,412 (7th Cir. 1991); accord Rosario, 386 F.3d at 170-71; United States v. Contreras-
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Subias, 13 F.3d 1341,1345 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. McMUlen, 917F.2d 773,776-
77 (3d Cir. 1990); Romero v. People, 179 P.3d 984,985,989-90 (Colo. 2007); Francis v. 
United States, 715 A.2d 894,895-98 (D.C. App. 1998); State v. Burt, 614 N.W.2d 42,46-
47(Wis.Ct.App.2000). 
As discussed above, defendant did not have a legitimate expectation that the 
court's calculation error at sentencing would be protected by the Constitution. The 
fact that defendant had already begun serving his sentence is therefore immaterial. 
In sum, the Constitution "'does not require that sentencing should be a game 
in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.'" United 
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117,135 (1980) (quoting Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 
160,166-67 (1947)). Granting constitutional imprimatur to clerical mistakes would 
result in defendants receiving a "fortuitous and undeserved windfall," a result not 
required by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Cardwell, 12 S.W.3d at 675. 
III. 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO ALLOCUTION WAS NOT 
VIOLATED 
Finally, defendant claims that his right to allocution was violated because he 
was not present when the court heard arguments on the State's motion to amend his 
sentence. Aplt. Br. 29-33. 
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While the Utah Constitution guarantees a defendant the "right to appear and 
defend in person/' Utah Const., art. I, § 12, the right to allocution does not apply 
when a trial court considers a motion to correct a clerical error. "The trial court may 
correct clerical mistakes in judgments at any time, with or without notice as the court 
may order/' State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388,1389 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added). In 
such cases, the defendant's right to allocution is satisfied "in the first sentencing 
hearing," so long as the hearing was "held in [defendant's] presence" and the 
defendant had the opportunity to speak. Id. at 1390. 
In this case, defendant was present and had the opportunity to speak at the 
original sentencing hearing. R. 127: 3, 14-15. Defendant's right to allocution 
therefore was not violated. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the final restitution order. 
Respectfully submitted September £ , 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
RYAN D. TENNEY V 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
*1 Appellant Lori Haase appeals the trial court's 
judgment pursuant to its interpretation of a special 
verdict form. We reverse the trial court's judgment 
and remand for the trial court to enter judgment of 
$820,000, plus statutory interest, in accordance 
with the jury's true intention. 
The hospital asserts that the trial court erred in re-
sponding to a mid-deliberation question from the 
jury without notifying counsel. It argues that it is 
entitled to a new trial under rule 47(o) of the Utah 
FN1 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 47(o) provides: 
FN1. The hospital actually cites rule 47(n) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
However, in 2003, rule 47 was amended 
and rule 47(n) was renumbered as 
47(o).&eUtah R. Civ. P. 47. 
After the jury have retired for deliberation, ... if 
they desire to be informed on any point of law 
arising in the cause, they may require the officer to 
conduct them into court. Upon their being brought 
into court the information required must be given in 
the presence of, or after notice to, the parties or 
counsel. Such information must be given in writing 
or stated on the record. 
" 'The language of rule 47(o) seems to require noti-
fication of the attorneys only when the jury is con-
ducted into the courtroom in the presence of the 
judge.' " Bearden v. Wardley Corp., 2003 UT App 
171,1 11, 474 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (quoting Utah 
State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263, 1271 (Utah 
1997)). In the present case, the jury sent its ques-
tion to the judge and received his reply without be-
ing conducted into the courtroom. Thus, the judge 
was not obligated to notify counsel prior to his 
reply. 
FN2. Although not required, it is good 
practice to notify counsel prior to respond-
ing to a jury inquiry. 
Additionally, neither the record nor the briefs indic-
ate that the hospital objected to the judge's mid-
deliberation communication with the jury. It is well 
established that "issues not raised at trial cannot be 
argued for the first time on appeal ... unless the pe-
titioner demonstrates that plain error occurred or 
exceptional circumstances exist"State v. Arguelles, 
2003 UT 1, \ 41, 63 P.3d 731 (quotations and cita-
tions omitted) (omission in original). The hospital 
does not argue plain error or exceptional circum-
© 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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stances and therefore fails to demonstrate that it is 
entitled to a new trial under Rule 47(o) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Central to Haase's appeal is the trial court's entry of 
judgment against the weight of affidavits and testi-
mony of the jurors regarding their intent. Haase 
correctly asserts that Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 
UT 36, 48 P.3d 218, is controlling in this case. In 
Bishop, the jury was asked to apportion fault among 
three parties, including the plaintiff (Bishop), and 
determine general and special damages. See id. at \ 
5. The trial court then subtracted Bishop's fault and 
entered judgment accordingly. See id.AX least three 
of the jurors later signed affidavits explaining that 
they had already subtracted the plaintiffs fault in 
calculating the general and special damages. See id. 
at \ 6. Based on these affidavits, Bishop moved to 
amend the jury verdict pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(a), arguing that the error was 
clerical rather than judicial, thus appropriate for 
post-verdict correction rather than a new trial. See 
zW.The trial court denied Bishop's motion, and on 
appeal the Utah Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded for the trial court to enter judgment accord-
ing to the true intent of the jury. See id. 
*2 We conclude the facts of the present case are in-
distinguishable from the facts in Bishop, and thus 
apply the supreme court's analysis to the facts of 
this case. Like the jury in Bishop, the Haase jurors 
were asked to perform calculations of both damages 
and apportionment. Both juries filled out special 
verdict forms that were interpreted by the trial 
courts to indicate other than their true intent be-
cause each trial court misunderstood the meaning of 
each jury's apportionment of fault. Jurors from both 
juries later signed affidavits indicating that in com-
pleting their respective special verdict forms they 
did not intend the court to use the juries' apportion-
ment of fault to reduce the damages they had spe-
cified. Thus, the error involved here was clerical, 
and the trial court erred in disregarding the true in-
tent of the jury. 
and remand for the trial court to enter judgment of 
$820,000, plus statutory interest, in accordance 
with the jury's true intent. 
FN3. Haase and the hospital each chal-
lenge several evidentiary rulings of the tri-
al court. Because of our ruling on appeal, 
we do not address Haase's evidentiary 
challenges. Regarding the hospital's evid-
entiary challenges, it fails to demonstrate 
prejudice. "[E]ven where error is found, 
reversal is appropriate only in those cases 
where, after review of all of the evidence 
presented at trial, it appears that absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a 
different result would have been 
reached."Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 1999 UT App 80,K 8, 977 P .2d 508 
(quotations and citations omitted); see 
alsoUtah R. Evid. 103(a). 
WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Associate 
Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge. 
UtahApp.,2003. 
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Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment 
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